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ABSTRACT
Given the increasing number of missions that are including rideshares, an established method of assessing mission
risks across programs with differing levels of risk tolerance is becoming essential.
The DoD Space Test Program has developed a method for Rideshare Mission Assurance (RMA) that seeks to allow
missions with different risk tolerances to fly together on a single launch, while shielding each mission from external
risks to on orbit performance. RMA is a process that allows all mission partners to accept self-induced or
programmatic risks (termed payload mission assurance risks) without having to evaluate any circumstances beyond
their direct control. RMA is not a “classic” mission assurance practice, as it does NOT take into account the on-orbit
functionality of the payload being assessed, and only assures that it will “Do No Harm” (DNH) to any mission
partners.
This paper details the basic criteria for assessing risks within the RMA process, as well as methods used to define
and delegate these risks to the appropriate mission partners. Also included are the basic test levels recommended for
proving compliance with the DNH premise of the RMA framework. The paper will also discuss the application of
the RMA process to past and future missions.
of criteria. The primary concern is to ensure that the
payloads are robust enough to survive the launch
environments experienced on the ride to orbit.
However, other areas are assessed as well, including
any co-use of facilities during the launch campaign and
the critical function inhibit scheme utilized by the
payload.

INTRODUCTION
The increasing miniaturization of electronics is causing
a growing number of organizations to develop and build
highly capable small spacecraft (less than 400Kg). As
the size and weight of spacecraft reduce, it is no longer
a guarantee that only a single satellite will ride on each
launch to space. Launch providers have begun looking
at ways to add additional payloads as “rideshares” to
utilize excess lift capability on both commercial and
National Security Space (NSS) launches as a way of
reducing costs.

All risks that come out of this assessment are broken
into two categories: payload mission assurance and
safety of flight. Payload mission assurance risks
generally only pose a threat to the payload being
assessed, and as such are accepted by each payload’s
Risk Acceptance Authority (RAA). Safety of flight
risks are issues that could potentially harm other
mission partners from the start of launch processing to
spacecraft separation on orbit, and are elevated to the
overall mission RAA.

Often, these rideshare-eligible small spacecraft are of
an experimental nature and are more risk-tolerant than
either the launch vehicle provider or the primary
payload for the launch. In order to assure a Class-A
program that adding a rideshare will not pose an
operational threat to the mission at hand, the DoD
Space Test Program (STP) has implemented a hybrid
system of risk acceptance termed Rideshare Mission
Assurance (RMA). The basis of the RMA process is to
provide all mission partners with a degree of comfort
that all payloads included on a mission will do no harm
(DNH) to any operational aspect of the primary mission
at large.

Critically, the RMA process is not used to evaluate the
on orbit operability and functionality of the payload
being assessed. It is only used to assure other mission
partners that the addition of a rideshare partner will not
preclude the ability of the mission partner to
successfully execute their mission. It is especially
useful when the risk acceptance authority for the
mission at large does not have a mission assurance or
risk acceptance role for all of the individual spacecraft
that are flying on the mission.

The RMA process does this by assessing each payload
flying on a mission independently, against a tailored set
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category. Safety of flight risks, however, are risks that
could affect another payload on the mission. A good
example of this would be an improperly tested bus
structure that could fail during launch, releasing foreign
object debris (FOD) into the fairing.

History & Future Use
The rideshare mission assurance process was developed
by the Space Test Program, SMC/SD (now SMC/AD),
and the Aerospace Corporation during the AFSPC-4
mission. This mission included a Space Experiment
Review Board (SERB) payload (called ANGELS) built
by the Air Force Research Laboratory and an SMCprovided primary payload (GSSAP). The AFSPC-4
mission was the first instance where STP was
responsible for integrating a highly risk-tolerant
auxiliary payload (APL) onto a launch with a highly
risk-averse primary. Rather than mandating that
ANGELS adopt a significantly more costly and timeconsuming Mission Assurance regimen, STP developed
the RMA process, which allowed ANGELS to accept
its own programmatic risks, but ensured that the
GSSAP mission wouldn’t be jeopardized. Examples
from the AFSPC-4 mission will be used to illustrate the
implementation of the RMA process.

Once properly categorized, pure mission assurance
risks can be effectively ignored by the mission at large,
because it is the responsibility of the payload provider
to assess and mitigate those risks internally. This allows
the overall mission management team to focus on how
to address the safety of flight risks that could threaten
multiple partners.
Not all risks fall into clear-cut categories. For example:
a risk of a flight computer failing to survive launch
(leaving a mission unable to turn on) would be
considered a mission assurance risk, since at first
glance, it poses no threat to the launch partners.
However, if the mission requires deployment into a
critical orbit (for example, GEO belt/ISS keep out
zones/sun-synchronous orbits), the computer failure
means that the spacecraft is no longer able to maneuver
to avoid debris or clear its orbital spot at the end of life.
This turns the mission assurance risk into a safety of
flight issue. In cases like this, it is possible to change
the mission parameters to move the risk from one
category to another. Instead of deploying directly into
the desired (critical) operational orbit, it is possible to
deploy into a disposal orbit and then maneuver into the
desired orbital slot. Now, a failure to be able to
command the spacecraft has no chance of harming
other parts of the mission, and the risk can be moved
from the safety of flight category to the mission
assurance category. This approach was used for the
ANGELS spacecraft on the AFSPC-4 mission, which
operates within the GEO belt. Instead of being released
directly in its desired orbit, ANGELS was released after
the second stage was moved into its disposal orbit, but
before stage deactivation. This allowed the team to
validate ANGELS’ functionality and maneuverability
before it could pose a threat to other spacecraft.

Looking forward, this process is being implemented on
two STP-supported missions: the Space Test Program 2 (STP-2) mission, and an upcoming Air Force launch
that will host AFRL’s EAGLE platform. STP-2 is an
EELV certification flight opportunity for the Falcon
Heavy, which is flying 13 ESPA and “ESPA grande”
class payloads built by eight different contractors, plus
24U worth of cubesats. STP-2 is an excellent example
of how the RMA process can ease the mission
assurance certification of complex missions. Given the
number of payloads and agencies involved in STP-2,
and the fact that all of these mission partners have
different risk tolerances, developing a certification
strategy would ordinarily prove challenging. The RMA
process, however, provides a framework to assemble a
cohesive mission assurance strategy out of many
disparate mission assurance practices and agencies. By
dividing risk and risk acceptance into separate mission
assurance and safety of flight categories, each
individual mission can accept its own programmatic
risks and perform its own mission assurance
certification, with safety-of-flight risks evaluated and
accepted at the mission level.

Launch Environments
Because of the nature of the do no harm analysis, most
of the time and effort involved in the RMA process
revolves around assessing both the robustness of the
payload design, and the environmental testing regimen
that is implemented. This is due to the proximity of the
payloads to each other and to the launch vehicle (LV),
as well as the extreme environments of launch. During
this critical time, even minor issues can pose a serious
risk to all mission partners, violating the DNH premise
of the RMA process.

IMPLEMENTATION
Binning Risks
The RMA process works by breaking risks into
categories: payload mission assurance and safety of
flight.
Payload mission assurance risks are risks that affect the
internal workings of an individual program. The
process of ensuring that all of the instruments on board
the spacecraft will be able to collect the data required to
meet mission success criteria would fall into this
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Because most Auxiliary Payloads (APL’s) and
rideshare missions are one-of-a-kind spacecraft that are
built on a limited budget, there is rarely the opportunity
to have separate qualification and flight units. This
necessitates applying “proto-qual” test levels (defined
in SMC-S-016) for structural considerations, and
further analysis for risks that fall outside the structural
realm.

Deployable solar arrays, large antennas, and other
lightweight structures will often remain acoustically
driven in certain frequency ranges. If analysis shows
that the spacecraft being assessed does have acoustic
sensitivities, then actual testing is required to
demonstrate DNH compliance. This testing can be
performed either at the system level (recommended), or
on just the sensitive components (allowable only if
system level testing is impractical). Like the random
vibration tests, acoustic tests should be performed to
proto-qual levels in order to demonstrate margin, and
all structures should be tested in their ascent
configuration. Acoustic testing can only be waived if it
has been collectively (launch integrator, customer, and
payload) determined via analysis that no components of
the spacecraft have acoustically sensitive components.

While this section provides test level guidance, it is
important to remember that risk tradeoffs must
sometimes be made. The goal of the RMA process is to
minimize the risk to the program at large. Under-testing
the payload by deviating from the recommended test
levels clearly introduces risk under the RMA process.
However, over-testing, whether due to conservative
environment definitions, over-excitation of resonant
structures, or other factors, also introduces risk, both
programmatic (schedule delays due to replacing items
broken during the test) and technical (excessive fatigue
on mechanical structures). Managing the spectrum of
risk represents one of the primary challenges of the
RMA process.

Shock
Historically, the driving shock event for any payload
has been its own separation from the launch vehicle,
and as such, an instrumented separation system test
would provide the required insight into the robustness
of the spacecraft. However, with the increasing use of
low-shock separation systems (PSC Motorized
Lightband, Ruag Clampband Opening Device) this
assumption can no longer be made. Analysis of the
shock levels imparted onto the payload by LV-induced
shock events (ignition, lift off, stage cutoffs, stage
reignites, fairing separation, rideshare partner
deployment(s)) must be assessed against the envelope
of instrumented spacecraft testing and the industrystandard 50 in/sec line (see MIL-STD-810G). Any
exceedances must be assessed individually.

This challenge is further exacerbated by the reality of
the rideshare process itself. Most rideshare mission
partners must design, and sometimes build, their
spacecraft before a launch is identified, and new entrant
launch vehicles may not have flight-validated
environments. Uncertainty about the actual launch
environment typically results in conservative test
specifications, which may increase risk of breakage
and/or fatigue on the payloads during test.
Random Vibration

Contamination
Random Vibration testing must prove that the
populated spacecraft is capable of surviving the LVinduced random vibration environment with margin,
and is assessed using a shaker table. The minimum test
level is 3dB above the envelope of the LV-provided
Maximum Predicted Environment (MPE) and the
minimum workmanship level provided in SMC-S-016
(which is also published as the draft MIL-STD-1540E).
Any notching included in the test must be based on
valid technical rationale, use industry approved force
limiting functions, and be approved before testing
commences. Reducing test levels to prevent component
responses from exceeding component qualification
levels or the predicted capability of components are
generally not valid technical rationales.

All spacecraft must be assessed against the risk of
contaminating sensitive components of other rideshare
partners. The RMA process must ensure that nothing
from the spacecraft being assessed can be re-deposited
on critical components of rideshare partners. This
includes both particulate matter and volatile
compounds. This requirement is assessed by a
combination of test (thermal vacuum) and analysis
(materials lists, contamination control plans, line of
sight to sensitive components). While thermal vacuum
testing is generally considered an electrical test, the
level and duration of the upper temperature soak can be
used to demonstrate that any volatile compounds will
have baked-out of the system and no longer pose a
threat to the mission.

Acoustic
Particulate matter mitigation must be addressed prior to
the first time payloads are in the same area, whether
this happens after they are encapsulated in the fairing or
in a co-used clean-room for launch processing. All

While most small spacecraft are primarily driven by the
LV random vibration environment, many individual
design elements remain acoustically sensitive.
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spacecraft must be cleaned to a level that they will not
cause a cleanliness violation for any other mission
partner.

solar arrays or antennas, as well as all transmitters.
Verification of this requirement by analysis only is
acceptable.

Other Areas of Consideration

VERIFICATION

Other areas, outside of launch environments, must be
assessed as well if they pose a threat to safety of flight
or ground processing. Some areas of particular concern
include inhibits, pressure vessels, and EMI/EMC.

Any safety of flight risks discovered during the RMA
process are documented and presented to the full
mission team. If any are determined to pose an
unacceptable level of risk to another mission partner, or
to the mission at large, it is the responsibility of the
spacecraft provider that is the source of the risk to
either implement the necessary changes to mitigate the
risk to an acceptable level, or to voluntarily remove
themselves as a rideshare partner. The primary risk
acceptance authority for the mission has the final say on
whether or not any payload has met its do no harm
requirements.

Electromagnetic Interference
Because most APL’s are launched in a “powered down”
state, EMI risks are generally assessed in relation to the
spacecraft processing period. Radiated Emissions (RE)
assessments of the spacecraft are performed to ensure
that any functional testing in a co-used processing
facility will not damage sensitive components of
rideshare partners. In addition to the RE testing,
Radiated Susceptibility (RS) assessments of the
spacecraft must also be performed to provide inputs to
all other rideshare partners’ RMA analysis. These tests
should be performed per MIL-STD-461E or equivalent.
If incompatibilities are discovered in the RE/RS testing,
simple mitigation steps can be implemented to reduce
risk. Simple mitigation steps might include using
antenna hats to eliminate free radiation, and organizing
time-sequenced tests between spacecraft to allow for
sensitive electronics to be safed.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT INSIGHT
For this process to work efficiently, sufficient insight
into the spacecraft design, integration, and especially
test process is required by the cognizant program
management. This insight is not limited to the
individual program’s management authority, but must
include the overall mission program management
whenever safety of flight risks are involved. Integration
and test methods must be detailed to the overall mission
management team to insure that the methods and
procedures implemented do not compromise otherwise
sound designs, and that all components used in the
buildup of the spacecraft conform to their respective
design specifications. Furthermore, any post testing
changes to the spacecraft (Component Remove &
Replace, new/differing payloads, etc.) must be vetted
by the program office prior to the implementation of the
changes in order to ensure that there is no additional
risk caused by the late stage changes.

Analysis must also be performed on the risks of
accidental in-faring transmissions. For spacecraft
launched in powered-down states the requirement for 3
inhibits on any transmitters mitigates this risk. For
spacecraft that launch in a powered-on state, additional
analysis and/or mitigations must be completed to ensure
that any potentially damaging emissions are prevented
from causing issues for rideshare partners.

The AFSPC-4 / ANGELS mission integration provides
an example. AFSPC-4 experienced a launch delay,
which provided ANGELS with a long storage period
following environmental test. ANGELS used this
opportunity to add components to their spacecraft to
improve capability, thereby breaking configuration
following environmental test. While this break in
configuration did not violate ANGELS risk acceptance
guidelines, it did pose an issue for the RMA process.
This issue was ultimately addressed by a thorough
analysis and risk acceptance process, but early
communication, understanding, and acceptance of the
RMA process might have prevented the issue from
arising. Such early communication is already underway
on the upcoming mission flying EAGLE, and
discussions of the do no harm RMA criteria have
already been held.

Pressure Vessels
If rideshare spacecraft have pressurized systems such as
propulsion, extensive testing must be performed to
insure that no failures will occur during launch.
Pressurized systems must be tested to proto-qual levels
as described by SMC-S-016 (1.5x Maximum Expected
Operating Pressure).
Electrical Inhibits
Industry standard requirements for inhibiting critical
functions of the spacecraft are not tailorable under the
RMA process (refer to AFI 91-710). At a minimum,
there must be three inhibits to the activation of all
critical functions. These include, but are not limited to:
propulsion systems, any deployable structures such as
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CONCLUSION
The rideshare mission assurance process, developed by
the Space Test Program for use on the AFSPC-4
mission, provides a framework for performing mission
assurance on multi-payload missions. It does this by
breaking risks into categories, and assigning risk
acceptance authority (RAA) levels based on how the
risks impact other payloads on the mission. Mission
assurance risks that only affect an individual payload
can be accepted by that payload’s RAA, while safety of
flight risks must be elevated to the mission RAA. The
criteria for categorizing all risks is “do no harm.” Test
levels for verification testing are generally at “protoqualification” levels as specified in the relevant military
or industry standard; however, rigid adherence to these
levels could involve technical risk tradeoffs, or have
significant cost or schedule implications. Engineering
judgment must be used throughout the verification
process.
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